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All statutory citations are to Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. 
JURISDICTION 
Sections 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 35-1-86 grant the court 
jurisdiction of this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did Jacqui Walls' injury to her foot arise out 
of the course of her employment with Uncle Bart's? 
Standard of review: The commission's decision is 
entitled to deference. An agency is entitled to deference 
1 
where the governing statute explicitly or implicitly con-
tains a grant of discretion. Morton International, Inc. vs. 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah, 1991). The Work-
ers7 Compensation Act grants broad discretion to the Indus-
trial Commission, as follows: 
35-1-16(1) "It shall be the duty of the commis-
sion, and it shall have full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place 
of employment and to administer and 
enforce all laws for the protection of 
the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees;" 
35-1-20. "All orders of the commission within its 
jurisdiction shall be presumed reasonable and 
lawful until they are found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or 
revoked by the commission." 
35-1-33. "A substantial compliance with the re-
quirements of this title shall be sufficient to 
give effect to the orders of the commission, and 
they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or 
void for any omission of a technical nature." 
These statutes clearly grant the Industrial Commission 
broad authority and discretion to interpret, construe, 
consider and determine the matters before it under the 
Worker7s Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Commission7s 
order in this matter is entitled to deference. 
Further, the Commission7s finding that Ms. Walls was 
not acting in the course of her employment at the time of 
her accident is a factual determination and must be affirmed 
if there is substantial evidence in light of the record as a 
2 
whole. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) and Grace Drilling vs. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
35-1-45. "Each employee mentioned in Section 35-
1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each 
such employee who is killed, by accident arising 
out of and in the course of his employment, wher-
ever such injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensa-
tion for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provid-
ed in this chapter. The responsibility for com-
pensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral ex-
penses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Industrial 
Commission denying the applicant compensation and benefits 
under the Workers7 Compensation Act for an injury she sus-
tained on December 29, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These are the relevant facts found by the Commission7s 
administrative law judge: 
The applicant, Jacqui Walls, worked as a bartender at 
Uncle Bart's, a bar in Ogden, Utah. R-36. Ms. Walls worked 
the day shift at Uncle Bart's from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
R-36. 
On December 29, 1989, after the end of her shift, Ms. 
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Walls' figuratively removed her bartender hat and donned the 
hat of a customer of Uncle Bart's. She remained at the bar 
drinking beer, shooting pool and socializing. R-37. She 
performed no work related activities. R-37. 
Ms. Walls' theory at the hearing was that she had been 
asked to remain and help train one Ryan Thomas, a new em-
ployee. R-37. The administrative law judge found that 
assertion was not worthy of belief in light of his observa-
tion of the applicant's testimony and the testimony of 
Thomas, who stated that he knew the things that Ms. Walls 
alleged she was to teach him, principally the operation of 
the cash register, and that he was supervised by one Toby 
Racine, the night manager. R-37, 38. 
Both Thomas and Racine were "large individuals", Thomas 
standing in excess of six feet tall and weighing at least 
215 pounds. R 37-38. Ms. Walls, at 5'2" tall and weighing 
102 pounds, is best described as slight. R-37. Ms. Walls' 
description of the accident and her motive for the action 
she supposedly was engaged in will show the relevance of 
this size difference. 
Sometime between 10:30 to 11:00 p.m., some five and 
one-half to six hours after her shift ended, Ms. Walls 
alleges that she took it upon herself to make a 13 0 pound 
keg of beer ready for tapping, although no one had instruct-
ed her to do so. R-37. As she opened the door of the 
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cooler where Uncle Bart's stored its chilled beer, a keg 
fell on Ms. Walls' foot causing the injury for which she now 
seeks compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act. R-
37. It beggars the imagination that a person of Jacqui 
Walls' physical stature was in fact attempting to help her 
employer by moving a keg of beer weighing more than she did, 
when both the bartender and assistant manager were present 
and more than up to the task. 
The administrative law judge found that Ms. Walls was 
not in the course of her employment at the time of her 
injury. R-38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the decision of the Industrial 
Commission because Ms. Walls' injury occurred long after her 
duty hours and while she was a patron, not an employee', of 
Uncle Bart's. 
ARGUMENT 
MS. WALLS FAILED TO PROVE THAT HER INJURY AROSE 
OUT OF THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT. 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that it was Ms. 
Walls' burden at the hearing to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that she sustained her injury in the course of 
her employment. Higley vs. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 
361, 285 P. 306 (1930). 
Section 35-1-45 provides that injuries are only compen-
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sable if they arise "out of and in the course of employ-
ment." Under Utah law, that phrase contains two separate 
conditions. The Commission's administrative law judge found 
that Ms. Walls did not meet the second condition which is 
that the injury must arise in the course of her employment. 
An injury only occurs "in the course of employment" if 
"it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his 
employer which he was hired to do or doing something inci-
dental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service." M & K Corp* vs. Indus-
trial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948). 
(emphasis added.) Reduced to its essence, the injury must 
occur while the employee is within her employment relation-
ship, as defined by the agreement between the parties. 
Obviously, one of the terms of that agreement is the employ-
ee's work schedule. Ms. Walls' injury occurred long after 
her quitting time, while she was at best a patron of Uncle 
Bart's and while she was outside of her employment relation-
ship. 
Whether an accident occurs before work starts or after 
it is over is an element which determines if an injury 
occurs within the course of employment. Generally, an em-
ployee who sustains an injury within a reasonable time 
before or after his or her shift is entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits. 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S 
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COMPENSATION § 21.60(c)- However, if an employee merely 
loiters after hours, she may be found to be outside the 
course of her employment. Ibid. In a case remarkably 
similar to this one, Lona vs. Sosa, 420 N.E. 2d 890 (Ind. 
App. 1981), the court found that a bartender was not within 
the course of employment at the time of his death when he 
stayed in the bar drinking for 2 1/2 hours after his shift 
ended, and was shot and killed by the assistant manager, 
apparently over a dispute involving a shortage in the till. 
When Jacqui Walls/ shift ended and she remained in the 
bar, her relationship to Uncle Bart's fundamentally changed* 
She became a customer. When that occurred, Uncle Bart's was 
no longer strictly liable under the Workers' Compensation 
Act for virtually any misfortune that may have befallen 
Jacqui Walls. As a patron, Uncle Bart's owed Ms. Walls 
those duties which a business owes to its customers, and 
subject to all of the rights and liabilities inherent in 
that relationship. 
On appeal, Ms. Walls, applying Black vs. McDonald's of 
Layton, 733 P.2d 154 (Utah, 1987), claims that she was in 
the course of her employment. Black is consistent with M & 
K Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, supra. They both re-
quire, as a condition to employer liability under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act, that the employee be working during 
the period of her employment and doing work which her em-
7 
ployer required her to perform. At the time of Ms. Walls' 
accident, Ryan Thomas, not the applicant, was the bartender 
at Uncle Bart's. Her responsibility to replenish the beer 
supply ended at the same time her shift ended, five and one-
half hours before her accident. Uncle Bart's neither ex-
tended her work hours nor called her back to duty to replen-
ish the bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Jacqui Walls failed to prove that she was in the course 
of her employment when she slipped off a barstool in Uncle 
Bart's and took it upon herself to ready a new keg of beer 
for consumption. Substantial evidence shows that at that 
time her relationship with Uncle Bart's was as a customer, 
not as an employee. Under Utah law she was not entitled to 
receive benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, and 
the Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the order of the 
Industrial Commission. ^ ^  
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /P day of November, 1992. 
c 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
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Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
November 20, 1990, at 10:00 o'clock a.m; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by Robert 
Breeze, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Uncle Barts, was represented by M. 
David Eckersley, Attorney at Law. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Bruce Wilson, Legal Counsel. 
FURTHER HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
March 23, 1992, at 8:30 o'clock a.m; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Applicant did not appear but was represented by 
Robert Breeze, Attorney at Law. 
Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Cynthia Anderson, Associate Legal Counsel. 
JACQUI C. WALLS 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
Subsequent to the first hearing in this matter, the 
Administrative Law Judge was informed by Mr. Eckersley/ counsel for 
the defendant and the estate of Bart Dunsdon, that the estate was 
insolvent, and, accordingly, the estate was dismissed as a party 
defendant. That left the Uninsured Employers Fund as the remaining 
party defendant in this matter. At the conclusion of the first 
evidentiary hearing in this matter, unrecorded telephonic testimony 
was taken from a co-employee of the applicant, Ryan Thomas. 
Pursuant to the objection of the applicant's counsel after the 
testimony had been taken, further proceedings were scheduled for 
the purpose of taking Mr. Thomas's testimony under oath. Those 
subsequent proceedings were had on March 23, 1992. It is 
interesting to note that the applicant did not appear at the 
further proceedings scheduled in this matter, and, as such, did not 
rebut the testimony of Mr. Thomas in this matter. Being fully 
advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared 
to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
At the outset, I should indicate that this case involves a 
serious credibility issue. This is especially so, since the 
original defendant in this matter, Bart Dunsdon, owner of Uncle 
Barts, passed away and, as such, is unable to either corroborate or 
dispute the applicant's testimony, concerning conversations and/or 
instructions she received from the decedent. Accordingly, for this 
reason, the credibility of the applicant is of critical importance 
as is the credibility of the only other testifying witness, Mr. 
Thomas. Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both 
the applicant and the witness, I conclude that the applicant's 
credibility is wanting in this matter. Because of the 
unavailability of Mr. Dunsdon, it is necessary to weigh the 
applicant's testimony, taking into full account the extreme 
likelihood that her testimony would be of a self-serving nature. 
Weighing the obvious self-serving nature of the applicant's 
testimony as against the testimony of Mr. Thomas, I find that Mr. 
Thomas has no interest in this matter, and, as such, his testimony 
is more credible. His testimony is especially more credible in 
light of the remaining circumstantial evidence contained on the 
file. 
The applicant was employed by Uncle Barts as a bar tender, and 
had started that employment in September of 1989. The applicant 
was so employed on December 29, 1989, when she alleges that she 
sustained a compensable industrial accident. The applicant 
testified that her shift started at 10:00 a.m., and would normally 




Ryan Thomas on December 29, 1989, was to work the evening shift, 
which started at 6:00 p.m., and continued until closing, which was 
at 1:00 a.m. . 
The applicant testified that following the end of her shift, 
she decided to hang around the bar and informed Mr. Dunsdon of that 
fact. The applicant contends that Mr. Dunsdon instructed her to 
help Mr. Thomas with the till. However, Mr. Thomas testified that 
he did not require any instruction with the till, and that besides, 
Mr. Toby Racine was the night manager and he was instructed to 
train Mr. Thomas. Mr. Thomas testified that the applicant was 
sitting on the other side of the bar, meaning that she was sitting 
on the stool during his work shift. The applicant in her direct 
testimony, admitted that she was engaged in social activities such 
as playing pool and the applicant admitted that she had four beers 
before her injury. Given the length of time the applicant was at 
the bar, I find her testimony that she only had four beers strains 
credulity. 
The applicant went on to testify that at approximately 10:30-
11:00 p.m., the applicant became aware that a keg of beer was 
empty. The applicant testified that she was going to get the keg 
ready for Ryan to tap, and towards that end, she went to the back 
room where cold kegs were kept in an old refrigerator. As she 
opened the door, the keg slid out and crushed her left foot. 
According to the applicant's theory of the injury, she was required 
to be on the premises to help Mr. Thomas with the till, and also to 
help him to get the keg ready for tapping. However, the 
applicant's theory of why she remained on the premises does not 
bear scrutiny. 
The applicant, herself, testified that after quitting time, 
she remained at the bar for the purpose of socializing and playing 
pool. Mr. Thomas testified that he already had been trained in the 
operation of the cash register by Mr. Racine, and, further, he 
testified that the applicant was performing no work related 
activities whatsoever during his shift. Rather, as admitted by the 
applicant, she was socializing and imbibing alcohol as a customer 
of Uncle Barts and not as an employee. That the applicant would be 
required to help Mr. Thomas with the keg, is also unbelievable, 
considering the physical stature of the applicant. The applicant, 
at the time of the injury, stood 5 fpot 2 inches tall and weighed 
approximately 102 pounds. The Administrative Law Judge takes 
judicial notice of the fact that a full keg of Coors beer contains 
15 and 1/2 gallons of beverage and weighs approximately 130 
pounds. The applicants testimony that she was somehow instructed 
or gleaned some implied instruction from Mr. Dunsdon that she stay 
five or six hours after work and help Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine 
with a keg of beer, is simply incredible. By contrast, Mr. Thomas 




Although I did not have an opportunity to observe Mr- Racine, 
the applicant testified on cross-examination, that bcth Mr, Racine 
and Mr. Thomas were rather large individuals, which rings true, 
since most taverns tend to prefer larger male individuals for 
"bouncer" purposes. That the applicant would have been expected to 
move a 13 0 pound full keg of beer at her weight of 102 pounds, 
simply defies logic. 
The more likely scenario, is that the applicant finished her 
work at 5:00 p.m., and having nothing better to do that evening, 
decided to remain at the bar after quitting time to play pool and 
drink beer. The applicant was not on duty, because Uncle Barts had 
two other employees on duty, namely, Ryan Thomas and Toby Racine. 
Mr. Racine was the night manager, while Mr. Thomas was the bar 
tender. The applicant apparently on her own, decided that she 
would ready the keg for Mr. Thomas, although she was instructed by 
no one to do so. Therefore, at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. on December 29, 
1989, I find that the applicant was not in the course of her 
employment, but rather, was on the premises of her employer as a 
customer, and not as an employee. I would also add that the 
applicants predominate motive at that time was not a good faith 
and intention to further her employer7s work, but rather, she was 
there for personal entertainment reasons. Any "benefit" to the 
employer was merely an incidental by-product. Therefore, I find 
that the applicant's injury did not arise out of and in the course 
of her employment on December 29, 1989. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The injury to the applicant of December 29, 1989, did not 
arise out of and in the course of her employment with Uncle Barts 
(Uninsured). 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the workers compensation claim of 
Jacqui C. Walls, alleging a compensable industrial accident arising 
out of and the in the course of her employment with Uncle Barts on 





IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
?3AM day of April, 1992. 
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Robert Breeze 
Attorney at Law 
211 East Broadway, Suite 215 
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Administrator 
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Cynthia Anderson 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6 600 
Jacqui C. Walls, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. • ' * 
* 
* 
Uncle Barts (Uninsured), * 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, * 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant filed a Motion for Review on April 23, 1992 of 
the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order of April 3, 1992. On 
April 23, 1992, also, the applicant filed a Motion For Order 
Extending Time In Which To File Motion For Review While Transcript 
Is Prepared asking for an extension of time until 15 days after the 
receipt of the transcript. On May 12, 1992, the applicant filed a 
perfected Motion for Review alleging the following errors: 
1. The ALJ's conclusion that the injuries sustained by 
the applicant did not arise out of and in the course of employment; 
2. Dislike of the ALJ lor the applicant, and his 
wrongfully attempting to cast the applicant in a disreputable 
light; 
3. The finding of the ALJ that the baiLend*?] >HI duty, 
Ryan Thomas, needed no help; and, 
4. The attempt by the ALJ to allow into evidence a 
telephonic question and answer session with an individual who 
purported to be Ryan Thomas. 
The respondent, Bart Dunsdon, namesake of Uncle Barts, died 
during the pendency of these proceedings, and as a result, his 
estate was dismissed as a party defendant. The Uninsured 
Employers' Fund was left as the remaining respondent since Uncle 
Barts was uninsured, and insolvent. 
The applicant had been employed at the time of the injury as 
a bar tender since September 1989. On the date of injury, December 
29, 1989, the applicant remained after her normal day shift ended 
at 5:00. She was replaced at that time by Mr. Ryan Thomas who was 
to work from 6:00 p.m. unti] ]:00 a.m. 
DENIAL OF MOTION 
FOR REVIEW 





The applicant alleges that she informed Mr. Dunsauu of her 
desire to hang around the bar, and that he instructed her to assist 
Mr, Thomas with the till- However, Mr. Thomas testified that he 
did not require any till instruction, and that Mr. Toby Racine, 
night manager, was required to train Mr. Thomas. 
Mr. Thomas testified that the applicant sat on the stool side 
of the bar during his shift. The applicant admitted to engaging in 
social activities such as playing pool, and had four beers before 
her injury. 
The applicant claimed to have become aware that around 10:30-
11:00 p.m., a keg of beer was empty, aiid that she went to the back 
room to get the keg ready for Mr. Thomas to tap. As she opened the 
refrigerator door where the cold kegs were kept, the keg slid out 
and crushed her left foot. She testified that she was required by 
Mr. Dunsdon to be on the premises to help Mr. Thomas with the till, 
as well as to get kegs ready for tapping. 
The ALJ determined that the applicant's version of why she 
remained at the bar was incredible based on her testimony, and that 
of Mr. Thomas. The ALJ concluded that the applicant probably had 
nothing better to do that evening, and so she decided to remain at 
the bar after her shift was finished to play pool and drink beer. 
The applicant was determined by the ALJ to not be on duty since 
there were two other employees on duty, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine. 
The applicant decided that jfhe^ jwould^ pn herown^eadyj^ 
Mr. Thomas, and the ALJ found that in doing so ^e^was^not in the 
teourse of her emplcjyiucnt;—she was a "customer for persona 1 
'ehtertcpftment reasons, and not an employee during this episode; 
and, Whatever benefit was derived by the employer was purely 
Incidental. Therefore, the ALJ found that the applicant's injury 
did not arise out of and in the course of her employment on 
December 29, 1989. 
An examination of the physical stature of the applicant 
compared with the employees on duty on the evening in question is 
helpful. The applicant is five feet two inches tall and weighs 
approximately 102 pounds. A full keg of Coors beer contains 15 1/2 
gallons of beer, and weighs approximately 130 pounds. Mr. Thomas 
stands in excess of six feet tall, and weighs at least 215 pounds. 
Although the ALJ did not observe Mr. Racine, the applicant 
testified that both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine were rather large 
individuals. 
We agree that the facts of this case as found by the ZUJJ WUV, 
saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and listened to their 




applicant. There is substantial evidence in the file to support 
the findings of the ALJ. 
With regard to the allegation that the ALJ's dislike for the 
applicant, except for the applicant's assertion of the ALJ's 
dislike for her, we find no evidence of bias, and the applicant has 
shown us no evidence to support such claim. We therefore find this 
assertion to bp without merit. 
Next, the applicant alleges that the ALJ eried when lie 
determined that Mr* Thomas needed no help, and that Mr. Thomas had 
been trained. As evidence that he was untrained, the applicant 
states that Mr. Thomas indicated that he had only been employed for 
one week, that many prices were unmarked, and that he was not 
familiar with all of the prices. 
The ALJ had ample evidence to conclude that the applicant's 
mission at the bar was not to assist Mr. Thomas with tapping a keg 
of beer. There was testimony that there were two people on duty 
during the period in question, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine, and 
either of them appeared to have been capable of performing this 
duty. There is no evidence that Mr. Racine did not know the 
prices, and there was testimony that Mr. Racine was in charge, and 
could have assisted Mr. Thomas with price and other information. 
When the physical size of the parties are considered, along with 
the circumstances under which the applicant was at the bar, we 
agree with the ALJ that her presence was social, and not as an 
employee. 
The last argument appears to be a makeweight issue which was 
apparently eliminated as an issue when the ALJ had a hearing in 
which Mr. Thomas testified. The applicant alleges that the ALJ "at 
one point attempted to allow into evidence a telephonic question 
and answer session with an individual who purported to be Ryan 
Thomas.11 The applicant states that she continues to object. The 
operative word here upon which this allegation of error must fail 
is "attempted." The claimant has neglected to show how she was 
prejudiced by this attempted session. Since the ALJ apparently 
delayed the hearing until Mr. Thomas could testify under oath, and 
could be cross examined, there could be no error. We note also, 
that the applicant did not appear at the hearing, but that she was 
represented by counsel. 
For these reasons, we find the ALJ's findings of fact, 
conclusions of lawr and order to be supported by substantial 
evidence in light of the entire record, and that the allegations of 





IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated April 3, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party sha]i bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
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